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While it sounded great to be asked to talk about composites, I found it difficult to
select subject areas that would be of real interest. My choice is based on saying
some things about where the maturity of the composite aircraft structures is today
and what that means in terms of future criteria for application. This focus was the
basis for my title selection. The other issue that will be addressed was requested by
NASA and focuses on composites structures cost. This fits well with the state-of-
the-art interpretations I will discuss first, since the cost issue must be viewed from
both the current status and future points of view. The difficulty in presenting
something in these areas is not in the subjects themselves but in trying to present a
real world viewpoint to an audience of composite experts. So, with recognition of the
expertise of the audience, I hope you will see something in this presentation about
how to view composite aircraft structure.
Introduction
• NASA- introduction and vision
• Composite aircraft - option validation
• Aircraft structure
• Composite cost considerations
• Composite potential- commercial
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As noted, my initiation into the composite field and my association with NASA
began at basically tlae same time. My first trip to NASA Langley was to take over
Boeing's first composite contract with NASA that Reid June
Boeing management had decided that Reid was to help
out on SST and I was to replace him on the NASA contract. My flight to NASA was
one of those that I am sure all of you who have traveled a lot have experienced. I
arrived at Newport News at 4:00 o'clock in the morning with the scheduled review
on the contract at 8:00 o'clock. As the picture shows, about a minute after Reid
introduced me as the new contract manager and the lights were dimmed for the
presentation, I caught up on my missed night's sleep. There were and are those
at NASA that have taken many opportunities to remind me of this, their initial
impression of me.
NASA- Introduction
\
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I feel it is only fair play that I give my friends at NASA the similar type of re-
minder they have often given me on my introduction to them. This chart is to
remind them about the NASA/ACEE program initial bid phase that was won by
Lockheed. As all company managements will, Boeing's wanted to know why they
lost the contract bid. Since Reid and I were the ones preparing the bid, we of course
went with our bosses to NASA to find out what we did wrong. There were several
reasons expressed by NASA for Boeing's loss. A simple one was that Lockheed just
had a better overall proposal. But one point that NA-SA focused on and that they
said was one of the keys for our loss was our use of the 737 vertical tail component,
since the 737 represented an aircraft with little future sales potential. My only re-
sponse to NASA now is to say I hope your vision into the future is better now.
NASA: Vision
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With this discussion of the past, between those I hope I can still call friends, let's
take a look at the status of composites technology from the point of view of the pre-
sentation title. I selected the title because I had a boss that said, "When a material
is considered during the preliminary design and product development phase of an
aircraft program on an equal basis with other material options, it has become a
viable option." I believe this is the status of composite materials today. What does
this mean in terms of the selection and potential usage on future commercial trans-
port aircraft. To understand this you need to understand the evolutionary changes
that take place in commercial aircraft and the role the service usage plays in the
design approaches taken. The selection of a viable material also means that it is
not selected because it is the fad or to start the technology learning process. The
scale on the chart emphasizes the equal weighing of all the structure material op-
tions on their merits. This means no bias criteria for or against a material systems
selection. I am sure all the members of the audience that have been promoters of
composites have experienced the imposition of special criteria on composites by those
not wanting to change from metals. Finally, the things that are needed to make the
change are a need to improve the product, an inhouse champion at the appropriate
management level, and a need in the marketplace for a new aircraft in a competitive
environment. The key here again is the acceptance of composites on an equal basis
and weighed on a scale with the same acceptance parameters.
Composite Structures Selection
• Commercial aircraft design environment
• Evolution
• Service time
• Selection from the options
• Criteria bias
• Weighing of options
• Making the change
• Need
• Champion
• Market
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This chart simply displays that we now have a significant history of composite
applications in military, civil, and commercial aircraft. This history also suggests
that with this background the technology base is such that the material is truly a
viable option for future designs.
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One of the questions often asked by management when stepping up to the selec-
tion of a new material system is "Do we know how to certify it?" This list of civil
and commercial aircraft components and aircraft that have been certified should em-
phatically answer that question in a positive manner. The certification process has
been experienced by all the large commercial airframe manufacturers. The FAA now
has the experience to deal with composite structural systems and to feel confident in
their certification process. This certification question can no longer be a basis for not
selecting composites on an equal basis with metals.
Certified - Applications
Key Primary Structure
• Transport category
• Aerospatiale/Aeritalia outboard wing
• Airbus A300-600 vertical stabilizer
• Airbus A310-300 vertical stabilizer
• Airbus A320 vertical and horizontal stabilizer
• DC-10 vertical stabilizer
• Boeing 737 horizontal stabilizer
11/15/89
3/28/88
6/10/87
12/15/88
6/O3/86
11/14/84
• Normal (civil) category
• Windecker Eagle entire aircraft
• Beech 2000 (Starship) entire aircraft
• Piaggo P-180 empennage, canard, and aft fuselage
12/18/69
6/14/88
5/07/90
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I show this picture of the Beech Starship since it is certified and in production.
It represents what can certainly be called an all composite aircraft. The issues of
fuel in the wing and a fuselage pressurized shell were both accounted for in its
certification process. With the production underway it will be the aircraft by which
all future composite civil aircraft will be measured. My salute to Beech Aircraft
Company for the development and certification of the Starship.
Starship
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Almost all my general or overview presentations have shown this picture, since
I believe it clearly dramatizes the size considerations that must be part of the step-
ping up to commitment of composites to commercial aircraft. The risk from a manu-
facturing and cost point of view is directly related to this size effect. The structural
mechanics are not different between fighters and commercial transports, but the
manufacturing differences are as great as the differences shown in this picture.
Those who have worked on large aircraft production readily recognize this size
effect.
Aircraft Size Considerations
Grumman F- 14A
_rop F-5A
General
Dynamics
FB-111A
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This is just another way of expressing the effect of size. It simply says that as
expected there are major structural differences in the 767 rudder and the AV-8A
wing. These differences are simply reflected in their weight differences, even though
their dimensions are very similar. The difference in their design requirements
obviously makes significant difference in their design details and the manufacturing
cost of those details.
Application Considerations
767 rudder
f433 Ib
AV-8A wing box
1,078 Ib
28 ft
- 34 ft ,.
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These two pictures show that the technology for design of composite components
covers not only the fighter size airframes but now covers wing spans that are similar
to large commercial aircraft. Therefore, to continue the argument that industry does
not have the background in large airframes is no longer a valid view of composite
airframe structures. This preceding discussion states simply and clearly that it is
now time and the industry is ready to complete the technology steps to the large
commercial aircraft of composites, a viable material option.
B-2 Bomber
Transport Size Transition to Composites
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The next step in assessing if the large commercial aircraft industry should step
up to the design and development of the final major components of wing and fuse-
lage lies with the need for new aircraft. The cycle for new commercial aircraft (those
not government subsidized) continues to grow in time. The past time cycle was 7
to 10 years and has more recently expanded to 12 to 15 years. This chart simply
shows that even with the new aircraft coming along now, there should be a market
for another new round of aircraft in the period 2005 to 2015. Therefore, the final de-
velopments needed for cost risk reduction in producing a commercial aircraft should
be addressed now. The current NASA ACT program, which this meeting is about,
has the right timing to aid the US commercial airframe companies to compete with
the rest of the world.
Market Forecast- Share by Airplane Size
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This chart shows that the cost of aircraft has followed a fairly well defined pat-
tern and that to compete in the future the cost of the aircraft must meet or beat this
established pattern. No company will risk the initiation of a new aircraft within its
own funding capabilities if it cannot be sure of its ability to not only project the cost
but to control the manufacturing cost after commitment to production. This scenario
leads directly to the reason that cost of composite structures is now the issue, not
structural technology. The evaluation and design of the structure will require the
continued development of better composite structural analysis tools. However, the
technology to manufacture that structure in an economical manner is the key to the
risk acceptance for the manufacturers. The measuring stick for assessing the suc-
cess of development of the manufacturing processes and tools will be the comparison
of the cost of large composite structures against the 50 to 60 year base for metals
structures, a tough comparison for composite structures.
1B
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This chart shows what we must consider in a plan to assess how to meet that
tough comparison with the manufacturing experience base of metal structures and
has been seen by many of you at other presentations and conferences, I show it here
because I believe in what it tells us so strongly. Our ability as structural engineers
and manufacturing engineers to save cost and weight decreases with program time.
As the program progresses to each following phase, opportunities for cost and weight
savings are lost. The first person to have the largest chance at cost and weight
savings is the configuration engineer as he draws the first three view drawings
and establishes the aircraft arrangement. From the aircraft arrangement comes
the structural arrangement against which various material systems and structural
concepts are assessed. There is complete freedom for structural considerations in
this stage of design development within the constraints of the airplane mission.
As can be expected, each following phase is constrained by decisions made in the
preceding phase. This scenario clearly suggests that cost and weight be a significant
consideration at the initial step as well as performance or mission requirements.
Program Schedule and Cost Savings
Decreasing Opportunities for Cost Savings
Dollars
Preliminary Product
design :tevelopmenl
Production
design
Production
Time _"
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This chart shows how the idea of the value of weight savings varies with the
same development cycle. During the initial phase it is not a very large number
since the optimism is that the design will easily meet weight projections and per-
formance requirements. When the cycle reaches the production drawing release, the
real weight numbers begin to appear and panic sets in to meet weight targets and
performance specifications. This raises the value of weight savings, and this is when
all the awards for weight savings are given. These two charts together suggest that
the awards in the production drawing release phase may add to the weight savings
needed to solve the overweight problem when recognized. However, since the sav-
ings are evaluated on a dollars/pound basis, this is a cost issue as well as a weight
issue and perhaps the award for both cost and weight saving should be issued in the
preliminary design phases as well. Simply stated, we may be giving awards at the
wrong time.
Program Schedule and Value of Weight Savings
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This chart (upper section) is one that I have used many times to focus on the
issues of static strength and damage tolerance of composites. The lower half of the
chart addresses the cost, considering both the manufacturing costs and the in service
maintenance cost. The bottom four items are of direct interest to this presentation.
The material cost is one of the issues that is being discussed at this conference.
The other is the so called "designed-in cost". Those are the costs that the designer
causes to occur due to the design he selects. The influence of the design process on
cost is the single greatest influence on product cost. The facilities that are available
and the manufacturing techniques selected by manufacturing rate second to the
designer effect on cost. The designer must be aware of and understand how his
design selection is affected by the available facilities and manufacturing methods.
There has been considerable written and said about the design and manufacturing
interface required on composites, and there is no need to repeat that here. I will,
however, add that I believe the need for this interface is much greater for composites
than for metal structures. However, as the next chart illustrates, the designer is the
key to real cost savings.
Structural Design Drivers
Safety
Economics
Static • Loads - external and internal
strength • Material and structural allowables
• Failure criteria and analysis
Damage • Flaw growth
tolerance • Residual strength
• Inspection
Flutter • Stiffness
margin • Flutter analysis
Maintenance
cost
• Durability - fatigue
• Inspection cost
• Repair cost
Production
cost
• Material cost
• Designed-in cost
• Manufacturing cost
• Quality control cost
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To allow the designer to make effective assessments of the cost of his design, he
requires tools to do it in the same manner that he meets the other requirement
displayed on this chart. This does not mean he must become a cost estimator, but
he needs tools that allow him to make cost one of the tradeable items as he goes
through the thought process for his design development. I believe that the post
design cost evaluation by an estimator does not allow the same degree of design
innovation as allowing the designer to work cost as one of his design parameters.
Since the design process that selects from many options occurs at various design
stages and detail levels, cost tools are needed at each stage and level. Real design
cost improvement can be made if we provide the designer with real cost evaluation
tools. These tools do not have to represent the dollar cost of the design, only the
relative cost of one design approach to another. With such tools in the hands of
the designers we will see considerable improvement in the "designed-in cost" of
composite airframe structures.
Designer's Tools
Design Designer's Design
parameter tools incentives
Safety f Mc fb
(strength) b- I M.S. Fb
Durability fmax, DFR, N reg
-1.0
Weight Density x volume = weight
Cost 9
Regulators
(FAA)
Warranty
Service life
Performance
Sales
Profit
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This weight and cost chart is an old one that we put together in the early 70's
and has been used repeatedly by many people at Boeing. What it displays does
not present anything different from what you would expect to see. The two major
components each make up about the same percentage of the total structural weight.
In a similar manner, the costs that are shown are as expected because of the size
of these components; they are a high percentage of the total cost. The fuselage
costs more because of its higher part count. However, when used in connection
with the next chart, one can begin to assess where to work the weight savings the
hardest and where to make cost the key design driver. These charts can tell you
how to approach design solutions such as damage tolerance as well. The approach
to each area of design can be initially established with this level of information. The
distribution may vary in small percentages--commercial transport to transportmbut
not significantly enough to not allow for this information to provide guidance of some
up-front design approach decisions to be made.
Weight and Cost Distribution
Commercial Aircraft
Percentage
of total
50 --
40 --
30 --
20 --
10 -
0
IBIB Weight
Cost
Wing Fuselage Nacelle*
and strut
*Powerplant weight and cost excluded
Empennage Other
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A simple and perhaps extreme example of cost as the key driver, is the interme-
diate ribs. These ribs do not support any external attachments or form fuel bays.
They simply maintain box shape and support the skin/stringers surface panels. They
usually have their web gages set by fuel slosh and must maintain a reasonable stiff-
ness to support the surface panels. These requirements limit their potential weight
savings. Therefore, the chart assumption was only a 10% weight savings, which
results in a negligible weight saving to the total airframe. However, in a study we
did in the same time period that we generated these weight/cost charts, we found
that on a dollar per pound basis these ribs were the most costly element of the wing.
Therefore, some simple review of the weight and cost history can guide you, as it
would for this example, to make cost the key design driver for intermediate ribs.
This can be done in those early pay-off design phases previously discussed. Simi-
larly, very obvious is the selection of the surface panels of the wing for weight saving
potential. Since it is a large contributor to total cost, the design must also reflect the
best cost options while allowing the maximum weight saving to be gained. Again,
many early inputs to the design process can be made from simple information and
design histories regardless of the material system. To most of you good composite
designers in the audience this is nothing new.
Weight-Saving Areas Selection
Structural Total
element, % Wing, % Fuselage, % aircraft, %
Wing
• Skin and stiffeners 25 15.5 5.7
• Spars 20 3.0 1.1
• SOB 15 1.2 0.4
• Special ribs 20 1.0 0.4
• Intermediate ribs 10 0.4 0.0
• Center-section beams 20 0.4 0.0
21.5 7.6
Fuselage
• Skin, stringers, and frames 25 10.8 4.0
• Keel and wheelwell 20 3.2 1.2
• Floors and floorbeams 20 2.4 0.9
• Doors 15 1.7 0.6
• Bulkheads 20 2.0 0.7
• Windows 15 0.8 0.3
20.9 7.7
• Aircraft total (wing and fuselage): 15.3%
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There has been and continues to be much discussion about composite designs
being "black aluminum" designs. The discussions say that if the designs were not so
black aluminum looking we could save more cost and weight. This chart shows we
should stop looking for the non-black aluminum. The geometry of the cross section
of aircraft structures looks the way it does because those are the most efficient struc-
tural shapes. How those shapes are made out of composites is a separate issue from
the shapes. Ply orientations and lay-up sequences are the real design differences
with composite structures. These shapes were taken from an old paper, Optimiza-
tion of Multirib and Multiweb Wing Box Structure Under Shear and Moment Loads,
by Donald H. Emero and Leonard Spunt of North American. I have not shown all
the cross sections displayed in that paper on this chart. If you can review that paper
and come up with some additional cross sections of significant differences, I would
like to hear from you. Let's focus our development time on the real issues remaining
to produce cost effective composite structures and not waste it looking for the non-
black aluminum shape or geometry.
Structural Concepts
Internally stiffened
.j" j"
Zee stiffened
"J" stiffened
.,&.__.&
Straight Y-tee stiffened
Trap corr semisandwich
Truss core semisandwich
Straight Y-stiffened Semitrap corr semisandwich
Integral tee
,,&_,&
Curved Y-tee stiffened
J3._.B.
Hat section stiffened
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These two photo charts are shown to add to my just discussed issue of "black
aluminum." The key surface panels of commercial aircraft are made of basically long
skinny members and panels. I believe that again to look for something different is
a total waste of development funds. The real question to be addressed with develop-
ment funds is how to design these shapes for the low manufacturing cost while se-
lecting those that will perform well structurally and save weight. The development
of manufacturing methods along with the design of these shapes needs to be the
focus. The manufacturing methods development must be focused not on just those
methods that are simply the lowest cost (without the recognition that these methods
must have the ability to produce these two shapes). Those manufacturing methods
that do not, from the start, recognize the effects of commercial airframe size and
these shape requirements will be a waste of development effort and funds. I want
to be careful here and not to forget to say that as the manufacturing methods for
these two factors are developed, there is a requirement for continuing development
to improve and enhance the structural data base and analysis t_ols. They offer the
means of opening the options door to the fullest for the design engineer.
Structural Elements
Wing Skin and Stringers
22 ORIGINAL PAGE
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Fuselage Skin, Stringers,
and Frames
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I have just made my case for not looking for the non-black aluminum designs and
the recognition of the key structural elements. These charts validate that industry
is effectively doing that in spite of continuing discussion of looking for non-black
aluminum designs. We have developed the tape laying machine that does in effect
the same job that the skin mill does. In the next chart we are developing pultrusion
machines we hope will make long skinny members like we machine on spar mills. I
present these pictures to show you have already recognized what I just previously
said. To improve on that you should continue to look further at the processes that
can produce these required shapes. I believe we have to take the correct steps
while allowing the non-knowledgeable to continue to look for the wrong thing, non-
black aluminum designs. We need to focus our effort on continuing to explore new
manufacturing methods that can reduce the cost of making the real structural
shapes required.
Metal and Composite - Skins
Skin Mills
24 ORIGINAL, PAGE
BLACK AND WHITE PHOTOGR;_F_
Tape Layup Machine
ORIGINAL PAGE
BLACK AND WHITE PHOTOGRAPH
25
No additional discussion is needed for this chart in addition to information pre-
sented previously. Let's just keep a continued focus on the right manufacturing
methods development. The following charts will show that we have at least as many
options as metals, if not more.
Metal and Composite - Stringers
Spar Mills
Pultrusion Machine
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In continuing to address the cost issues the question often arises as to the struc-
tural and manufacturing options available with composites. They are still viewed
by some as a new structural system, but I am certain not by those of you in this
audience. A reduced set of structural and manufacturing options seem to be im-
plied. This may be limiting the usage of composite structural applications. These
two charts are presented to show simply that I don't see it that way and that the
options in both cases are equal. We have yet to see all that might become available
for composites. We may still have some development or learning to apply to what I
show here, but I believe they are all possible.
Structural Options
Options
• Joining
• Mechanical
• Bonding
• Integral
• Configurations
• Skin and frame
• Skin, frame, and major
Iongerons
• Skin, frame, and stringer
• Honeycomb and frame
• Honeycomb shell
• Grid stiffened and frame
• Grid shell
Metal Composite
* * (Cocure)
. .k
. -k
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This chart makes a similar statement about the fabrications options available fi_r
composites. Neither of these charts is said to be complete in terms of all possibilities
but to be reasonably representative of the current development status.
Form and Fabrication Options
Metal
• Element forms
• Sheet and plate
• Extrusion
• Forging
• Shaping
• Roll forming
• Hydropress
• Machining
• Stretch forming
• Joining
• Mechanical fastening
• Bonding
• Diffusion bonding
• Welding
Composite
Tape layup and filament winding
Pultrusion
Resin infusion
Hot forming and thermoplastic
Hot forming and thermoplastic
Aligned discontinous fibers and thermoplastic
-k
Cocuring
Thermoplastic fusion
28
From the two previous charts I tried to show that the composite designer has
the same degree of options open to him as the metal designer. The manufacturing
methods offer the same level of options. I did not say that the manufacturing meth-
ods were equal in cost or efficiency. Metals manufacturing has a considerable head
start in both the development and applications aspects of the methods. This chart
addresses an applications aspect that may sometimes be overlooked when making
cost comparisons. This chart shows that the learning curve, I believe, is not straight
as often depicted by the dashed line, but is more like the solid line. The solid line
shows that in the production of the first 30 to 40 aircraft there is little so-called
learning going on. This is due to the high number of changes that usually occur as
the aircraft goes into production and both engineering and manufacturing correct
their mistakes. The steep slope indicates that changes are reduced and the real
people-learning takes place. This is followed by a lower but continuing reduction in
man-hours per aircraft. This slope does not represent any continued people-learning
improvements but those improvements due to manufacturing methods and tooling
changes that are made to reduce cost. These changes are only made when the cost
savings can be shown to be effective over the remaining production run. These
changes and ideas are carried forward to the next design. The point of the chart
is that this carry over is not zero for composites but it does not have the years of
background that metals have available. While the composites are not at zero as I
show (relative to the final slope), they are so close to that for commercial transport
major components that it represents the real position relative to the metals for 50 to
60 years. This number of years' difference makes it very difficult for composites to
compete on cost alone.
Learning Curve
Labor-
hours
Composites Metals
Units produced
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This chart suggests one of those areas that can be addressed now, and I do not
believe it is being addressed in competition with metal. If I need a clip or short
stiffener of composite material, it is usually manufactured for that specific location
and usage. In metals I have standards books of extruded shapes and possibly a
set of rolled shapes. From these I can of Len select what I need. If one looks at the
many uses of clips or brackets and web stiffeners used in aircraft, one wonders
why a supplier has not come forward for this structural element. A large number
of metal extrusion dies have been developed over the years just noted. Maybe it's
time to start something similar in composites. I made a very rough estimate of
the number of short stiffeners or attachment clips on a commercial transport. My
estimate is that more than a million feet per year would be needed based on 10,
767 size airplanes a month. If a simple angle were produced in a standard lay-up
and angle, say 90 degrees, there are many locations where it could be used. It is
possible that if that angle were made of thermoplastic, it could be used for angles
other than 90 degrees by placing it in a heated die to change the shape angle. If
there are other items to be addressed as composite structural standards, I leave that
to this audience.
Stiffeners- Requirements
Spar Stiffeners
3O
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We are hearing a lot about the cost of composite materials and that it is difficult
for composites to compete with aluminum on the basis of just the basic material
cost alone. This chart is based on some data from a NASA document looking at
the cost of composite material relating to type of composite material. I have taken
that data and ratioed it to the cost of aluminum. The displayed ratios agree that
composite material costs are high. When we have ratios this high in comparison
with aluminum it is difficult for composites to compete on a cost basis. However,
I offer the right hand graph on this chart as another look at this cost ratio. If we
consider the out-the-door cost of the materials rather than just the in-the-door cost,
we get a different picture. For wing skins, we order special large roll taper skins,
and we oi%en machine away 60 to 70 percent of the material. For certain airlines
that like shiny fuselage skin, we order premium sheet. Neither of these elements,
that are part of the previously shown major weight contributors, are purchased at
the base price of aluminum. Second, when we consider the 60 to 70 percent chips in
the machined skins (even with the 50-a-pound resale on the chips) the cost ratios
are significantly altered for the out-the-door cost ratios. I should note that my
comparison on material cost only addresses the material cost and amount used;
no labor is included. The general utilization of composite materials is in the 120%
range. That is, we need 120% of the out-the-door weight in-the-door to make the
parts. This comparison changes the ratio to about 20 to 30% of the in-the-door ratio
between aluminum and composites. Let's be sure we recognize this aspect before we
say how expensive composite materials are as compared to metals.
Material Cost Comparison
Composite Versus Metal (Aluminum)
Metals (Aluminum) and
Composites Cost Ratios
Current materials
Thermoplastic
Toughened resins
Thermoplaslics
Toughened resins
Metal (aluminum)
I I
' T-300/AS-4
fibers
Cost
T-g00/M-7
fibers
0 5 10 15 20 25
Material cost ratios in the door
1
3O
Material Usage
_.....t---"""C o m po site s 1
Ratio 1 _
tal (Aluminum)
I
In the Usage Out the
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While I have just defended the cost of composite materials, I would like to send
a message to the material suppliers here by again using a chart from a NASA
report. If this chart is right, and I believe the trend it shows is correct, then the
suppliers need to examine their marketing approach and recognize the business
potential out there for them if the price of composite materials can be reduced.
The reduction in cost can make the application expand to the major structural
elements of the airframe, namely the wing and fuselage. I believe continuing effort
on the part of the suppliers is needed and should be part of all future research and
development. The airframers need to continue to clearly define their needs and
their manufacturing approaches, while the supplier needs to identify the items in
the airframer's requirements that are the key cost drivers in the product. They,
of course need to, on their own, continue to look for ways to reduce their cost so
they can pass it on in the reduced price of composite materials. The market target
potential is so large with the development of an all composite commercial transport
that this cost aspect is as important as any needing attention.
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All of us here, as well as those involved in the development of composite struc-
ture, have, I am sure, tried to dream up as many reasons possible that composites
produce benefits to both the airframe manufacturer and the aircraft user. The ones
I have selected here I believe are real. They are either well defined today for com-
posites or will be in the future when fully applied to the commercial transports.
We have shown over and over again we can save weight, and you have heard that
again at this conference. The performance resulting from that saving certainly can
produce fuel saving and again, in today's world climate, that is becoming an issue
for the airlines. In terms of maintenance the fatigue characteristics of composites
will continue to reduce the fatigue maintenance requirements significantly. The
area that composite structures has not received enough benefits credit for is the
area of corrosion. Many dollars go into the airframe manufacturing process for the
addition of corrosion protection of the structure. Similarly, the airlines spend many
dollars maintaining this corrosion protection in their fleets. The use of composites
eliminates a major portion of this requirement for corrosion protection. The chart
on the right shows only a small part of the corrosion protection applications applied
to Boeing aircraft. Finally, I believe as we continue our learning process in how
to produce large commercial transport composite structures, we will see more and
more opportunities to reduce the cost of composite structures and accrue additional
benefits.
Composite Application Benefits
• Performance improvements - weight saving
• Fuel savings
• Improved DOCs
• Reduced maintenance
• Large reduction in fatigue problems
• Corrosion maintenance greatly reduced
• Potential manufacturing cost reduction
• Better material usage
• Reduced assembly (more monolithic parts)
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As noted, this chart does not show all the corrosion protection areas for commer-
cial transport (which is a significant cost item in the manufacture and maintenance
of the aircraft).
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Where are the key development needs? As I see it, this list presents my best
assessment of the continuing development needs as they relate to commercial trans-
port aircraft. I am sure that not everyone will agree with this list, but I believe it
encompasses some of the key needs. Many at this conference have talked about
the cost of composite structures, and I have briefly addressed it today. Cost may
represent the largest stumbling block to the application of composites to commercial
aircraft. The large pressure shell considerations are the key concerns for the appli-
cation of composite to commercial aircraft fuselages. The Aloha Airlines incident
of a couple of years ago keeps before us the fatigue and pressure issue in metals
and reminds us not to short change those same issues in composites. If we expand
the use of composites, we will surely want to raise the strain levels used with time,
and in doing so, the low strain level of usage we have employed previously will not
provide the error protection of the past. Therefore, we need to continue to expand
our knowledge on the issues of fatigue and flaw growth, even if we plan to design to
a "no growth" approach with composites. Finally, for commercial transport aircraft
certifications we need to continue to address the issue of the effect of environment
on composite structure full scale validation tests. Also, the issue of proof of the "no
growth" approach needs very careful review. I believe the enhanced loads approach
to be totally wrong; therefore, I included this issue in the needs list of areas for
continuing development support.
Composites Continuing Development
Development Needs
• Material cost reduction
• Manufacturing cost reduction
• Fuselage pressure shells - damage tolerance
• Industry accepted - failure theory
• Effects higher strain utilization
• Fatigue
• Flaw growth
• Certification - additional validation of -
• Ambient full-scale testing
• Flaw "no growth" approach
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This chart is one that an oldtimer has the privilege of presenting. The whys and
wherefores of these dates are many and well developed by my personal prejudices
on composites, but I thought I would leave them with you as reasonable targets and
challenges for the commercial airplane people in the audience.
I again want to thank NASA for inviting me to make this presentation and to say
thanks to those many friends at NASA who have helped me over the years. Also my
thanks goes to those of you in the audience that I have worked with on committees
and contracts that have helped me and been my friends for these many years in
composites. And, of course, to many associates and friends at Boeing who are here,
thanks for your great support and help over the years. I hope that all the goals of
the ACT program are achieved and the benefits well recognized by the non-technical
community as well as by the technical community.
Application Projections
Large Commercial Transports
• Complete composite structures
• Wing - before year 2000
• Fuselage - by year 2010
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